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Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries
Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages
John M. Conno,; & Robert H. Lande"
ABSTRACT: Antitrust law provides treble damages for victims of antitrust
violations, but the vast majority ofprivate cases settle. The average or median
size of these settlements relative to the overcharges involved has, until now,
been only the subject of anecdotes or speculation. To ascertain what we term
"Recovery Ratios," we assembled a sample consisting of every completed
private U. S. cartel case discovered from I990 to mid-2 0 I 4 for which we could
find the necessary information. For each of these 7I cases we collected, we
assembled neutral scholarly estimates of affected commerce and overcharges.
We compared these to the damages secured in the private cases filed against
these cartels. Our main findings are that the victims of only I4 of the 7I
cartels (20 %) recovered their initial damages (or more) in settlement. Only
seven (I 0 %) received more than double damages. The rest-the victims in
57 cases--received less than their initial damages. In four cases the victims
received less than I % of damages and in I2 they received less than IO %.
Overall the median average settlement was 3 7 % of single damages. The
unweighted mean settlement (a figure that gives equal weights to the cartels
that operated in large markets and to those that operated in small markets)
was 66%. However, because plaintiffs tend to be rewarded relatively poorly
in the largest cases, the weighted mean (a figure that weights settlements
according to cartels' sales) was only I9 %. The mean and median average
Recovery Ratios are higher(8I.2 % and 52.4 %, respectively)for the 36 cases
that followed criminal convictions of u.s. antitrust law. The conclusion of
this Essay briefly discusses some of the implications of these findings.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In theory, VIctIms of antitrust violations receive treble damages. l In
practice, however, almost every successful antitrust damages action settles.
Because final verdicts in antitrust cases are exceptional, it may be more
accurate to describe the antitrust damages level not as "treble" damages, but
as the average or median percentage of damages successful antitrust cases
actually settle for.
Until now the actual average or median size of antitrust settlements has
only been a matter of speculation. To bring empirical analysis to this issue, we
assembled a sample of 71 cartels for which we could find the necessary
information. We believe that the sample includes every completed private
U.S. cartel case since 1990. For each cartel a neutral scholar calculated the
firms' United States overcharges. We compared these results to the damages
secured in the private cases filed in the United States against these cartels. We
find that the victims of only 14 of the 71 cartels (20%) recovered their initial
damages (or more) in settlement; of these, only seven (10%) received at least
double damages. The rest-the victims in 57 cases-received less than their
initial damages. Four received less than 1 % of their damages and 12 received
less than 10%. Overall, the median average settlement was 37% of single
damages. Because the distribution of settlement percentages is so skewed, the
weighted mean (a figure that weights settlements according to their sales) is
much lower (19%) than the unweighted mean settlement of 66% (which
gives equal weights to the cartels that operated in large markets and those that
operated in small markets), because plaintiffs tend to be rewarded relatively
poorly in the biggest cases.

I.
IS U.S.C. § Is(a) (2012). Successful victims also receive "the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." [d.
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Our analysis of the "Recovery Ratios" (i.e., size of antitrust settlements
relative to damages) will proceed in the following parts. Part II briefly explains
why almost every antitrust case settles. Part III analyzes whether these
settlements are likely to be at the "right" levels. Part IV analyzes our sample of
cartel settlements and the size of the damages recovered by plaintiffs in these
cases. Part V shows that both the deterrence and the compensation goals of
antitrust necessitate damages that significantly exceed the violations' actual
damages. Finally, in Part VI, we present some conclusions and implications of
our work. Throughout this Essay we will use cartels as an example, although
we also will discuss how these results might apply to different types of antitrust
violations.
II.

ALMOST EVERY SUCCESSFUL ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTION SETTLES

Almost every successful antitrust damage action settles.' We expect this
to happen. 3 We expect that most parties would settle for a sum that might be

2. "Settlement agreements invariably involve compromise and risk, and the decision to
settle or not is a strategic one that is an ordinary part of the litigation process." 1 PHILIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION' 205g, at 285 (3d ed. 2006). "As would be expected, a large percentage (70-88%)
of antitrust cases are settled." E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, HOWARDA. SHELANSKI
& CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE: CAsES, MATERIALS,
PROBLEMS 137 (7th ed. 2014) (citing S. Salop & L. White, Private Antitru.st Litigation: An
Introduction and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 10-11 (L. White ed., 1988)). This
is true for many or most other areas of law as well. For example, "the overwhelming majority of
all patent litigation settles." Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl
Shapiro, ActivatingActavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 23 n.51 (2013). For convenience, we will sometimes
refer to the parties using such terms as "victims" and "violators" even though, unless there was a
civil or criminal judgment in the same matter, a term like "alleged victims" or "alleged violators"
would be more accurate.
3. As Professor Leslie cogently observes:
Judges and litigants generally view settlement as a win·win outcome. Because
plaintiffs face great difficulty in winning antitrust cases, settlemen t is attractive to
class counsel, who want to ensure some recovery for both the class and themselves.
Conversely, because damages awarded upon a plaintiff s victory in antitrust litigation
are automatically trebled, the risk-averse defendant has a strong incentive to settle
in order to eliminate the pricey worst-<:ase scenario. Presiding judges, too, favor
settlement and routinely attempt to convince and sometimes cajole litigants to settle
their litigation rather than rely on juries to resolve the dispute. Courts often invoke
the '''strong judicial policy in favor of settlements, particularly in the class action
context.'"
Settlement purportedly carries several benefits. First, settlement brings certainty
to an inherently uncertain process. All interested parties seek repose: defendants
want to minimize their exposure, the class wants some compensation, and the class
counsel want to ensure that they recover their costs and receive some remuneration
for their efforts. A settlement guarantees that defendants will not face bankrupting
liability and that the class members (and their counsel) will not end up with nothing.
In addition to assuring some recovery for the class, settlements generally speed the
delivery of payments, as class members do not have to wait for the years of pre-trial,
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expressed as the discounted present value of the expected probabilities that
various recovery amounts would constitute the final verdict if the case went to
trial and survived appeal.4 Of course, this would be true only if a number of
conditions held, including rationality on the parts of both plaintiffs and
defendants, adequate and symmetric information, risk neutrality, an equal
view of the strength of the plaintiffs' case, and no compelling short-term need
on the part of either party.5 If these assumptions hold, and if the parties share
an assessment of the likely underlying parameters, then-in light of the
extreme cost, risk, and time involved in litigation-both parties have a strong
incentive to settle. 6
We know of no reliable data on the percentage of antitrust cases that
settle or that go to final verdict, either for cartels or for other types of antitrust
cases. We do know, however, that final verdicts in cartel cases are extremely
rare. In an earlier study, we searched antitrust cases since 1890 for final
verdicts in cartel damages actions that calculated an overcharge amount and

trial, and appeals processes to run their courses before receiving recompense from
the defendant. Similarly, the class counsel-who, absent a settlement, would not get
paid until years later-receive their fees and reimbursements for costs sooner with
a settlement.
Second, settlements conserve judicial resources. Class action litigation taxes the
legal system, contributing to the backlog in American courts. Judges favor
settlements as a docket-clearing mechanism. Judges are especially eager to remove
complex class action suits from their dockets. Indeed, some judges have gone so far
as to endorse "the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than
a good trial." Other judges view a trial as evidence that the attorneys have failed.
Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebeling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation,
50 ARIz. L. REv. 100g, 1012-13 (2008) (citations omitted).
4. For example, if the parties both believed the case involved a 50% chance of a $1 million
recovery, a 25% chance of a $4 million recovery and a 25% chance of no recovery, we would
expect a settlement of, ceteris paribus, $1.5 million. Of course, other factors, such as the time-value
of money, also would have to be examined.
5. The effects of both sides' legal fees also would have to be considered, as well as antitrust
law's one-sided fee-shifting provision.
6. Professor Leslie observes that the test most frequently used by courts to determine the
reasonableness of a settle men t is the" Grinnell factor test," which considers:
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of
the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of
establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial;
(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; [and]
(9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light
of all the attendant risks of litigation.

Leslie, supra note 3, at 1017 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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were not overturned on appeal. We found only 25. 7 Our search surely missed
cases, and final verdicts in other areas of antitrust might well be more
common. But we safely can say that final verdicts in damages cases are
unusual. 8
Although we do not know what proportion of private cartel cases go to
final verdict, we do know that virtually every filed U.S. criminal cartel case is
followed by or accompanied by at least one private damages action.9 Thus,
although we do not know the percentage of filed damages actions litigated to
a final verdict, an upper bound on this figure can be calculated very
approximatelylO by dividing the number of final victories we found-25-by
the number of criminal cartel cases filed during the same time period: 2569."
This crude approximation indicates that at most perhaps only 1 % of filed

7. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implicationsfor
optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TuL. L. REv. 513, 551-59 (2005) (surveying final verdicts in cases against
cartels).
8. This Essay's study of 71 cartels found verdicts only in e-books and in vitamin C imports
from China. See generally United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re
Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
9. See John M. Connor, Private Recoveries in International Cartel Cases Worldwide: What Do the
Data Show? II, 31 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012), available at http://
www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/fiIes/WorkingPaperNoI2-03.pdf.This study of 130
private settlements shows that for every international cartel that resulted in a criminal conviction,
a private case was filed. Sometimes private cases are filed before the Department of justice's
("DO]") criminal case is filed, and it can be extremely difficult to determine which party first
uncovered the alleged violation. For examples, see Robert H. Lande &Joshua P. Davis, Benefits
from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 879, 897-99 (2008).
Indeed, "[iJn a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are
by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government." Herbert Hovenkamp, Quantification of
Harm in Private Antitrust Actions in the United States I (Univ. ofIowa Legal Studies, Working Paper,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=I758751.
10. Of course, many damages actions are filed in cartel cases where there was no criminal
complaint, and often more than one private case is filed against a cartel, so this calculation is only
an order of magnitude approximation. For examples, see Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande,
Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment ofPrivate Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEAITLE U. L. REv.
1269, 1292 (2013); Lande & Davis, supra note 9, at 898.
II. Total calculated. as followed: 694 criminal antitrust cases were brought by the DO]
between 1890 and 1969. See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L.
& ECON. 365, 385 (1970). An additional 1875 criminal antitrust cases were brought by the DO]
between 1970 and 2004. See ANTIRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF ANTITRUST, ANTIRUST DIVISION
WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1970-1979, at 6, available at http://wwwJustice.gov/atr/public/
215792.pdf (showing 236 cases brought between 1970 and 1979); ANTIRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF
ANTITRUST, ANTIRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1980-1989, at 6, available at
http://wwwJustice.gov/atr/public/215423.pdf (showing 782 cases brought between 1980 and
1989); ANTIRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF ANTITRUST, ANTIRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY
1990-1999, at 4, available at http://wwwJustice.gov /atr/public/ 246419. pdf (showing 634 cases
brought between 1990 and 1999); ANTIRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF ANTITRUST, ANTIRUST DIVISION
WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2000-2009, at 5, available at http://wwwJustice.gov/atr/public/
28 I 484.pdf (showing 223 cases brought between 2000 and 2004). Adding together the statistics
compiled by Richard Posner to the DOJ figures, the total number of criminal antitrust cases filed
by the DOJ between 1890 and 2004 was 2569.
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cartel damages cases have been litigated to a verdict that stands up on appeal.
Because many private damages actions are filed even though no related
criminal case is filed, and because often more than one damages case is filed
against a cartel, this percentage is a high estimate. ' • Nevertheless, this
indicates that, as a very rough approximation, perhaps 99% of filed damages
actions were dismissed or settled.
By contrast, a lower bound on the percentage of cartel damages actions
that settle can be computed by dividing the total number of final cartel
verdicts by the total number of antitrust cases filed during the same (1890 to
2004) time period: approximately 40,000.13 This second rough estimate
suggests that, if every private case had been a damages action against a cartel,
only perhaps .06% of the private cases would result in a final verdict.
Interestingly, if cartel cases historically have constituted 16% of all private
cases filed, our two approximations would be roughly equivalent. Regardless
of the actual percentage, however, it is safe to conclude that final verdicts are
a tiny percentage of the total damages actions filed against cartels. The
overwhelming majority of damages actions settle or are dismissed.
Even if most of the meritorious damages cases settle, we naturally would
not expect many to settle for even close to treble damages. '4 The next Part
explores whether antitrust settlements are likely to be greater or less than the
"right" amount, if they were based only on the merits and plaintiffs'
probability ofb.eing awarded various sums.lS

III. ARE SETTLEMENTS LIKELY TO BE AT THE "RIGHT" LEVEL?
There is a long-held belief in the antitrust community-one that never
was supported with systematic evidence-that "good" antitrust cases settled
for single damages. '6 More recently there have been assertions that
"[p]ayments well below single damages are now the norm."17 Surely victims
1 2. See Davis & Lande. supra note 10, at 1280.
13. Richard Posner estimated that the number of private antitrust cases filed from 1890 to
1969 was 7495. Posner. supra note 11. at 371. Between 1970 and 1974. approximately 6000
private antitrust cases were filed. William Kolasky. Antitrust Litigation: What's Changed in TwentyFive Years? 27 ANTITRUST 9. 9 (2012) (providing a chart of private antitrust filings. upon which
we base our approximation). Between 1975 and 2004. 26.958 private antitrust cases were filed.
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE:
ANTITRUST CAsES FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS. available at http://www.albany.edu/source
book/pdf/t5412012.pdf. These three figures total 40.453.
'4. Indeed. in light of the factors mentioned in this Part. we would expect defendants to settle
for actual treble damages only if they are mistaken about the actual amount of damages involved.
15. This formulation is subject to many conditions and caveats. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
16. See Robert H. Lande. Five Myths About Antitrust Damages. 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 651. 660 n.40
(2006).
17. Leslie. supra note 3. at 1036. "In the usual antitrust case (particularly a class action).
even though the antitrust laws provide for damages three times the amount of the illegal
overcharge. the settlement amount is a fraction of the estimated actual overcharge." DAVID BOIES.
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sometimes recover less than they "should" based only on the merits and the
other conditions noted earlier. 18 Surely on other occasions the victims receive
more. It seems extraordinarily unlikely that every case would settle for just the
"right" amount.
Assuming we knew how much particular cases "should" settle for, should
we expect actual settlements to be generally too high, too low, or at the right
level? It is important to keep in mind not only the parties' incentives but also
the attorneys' and judges' incentives. This applies with particular force to the
plaintiffs' attorneys in class actions, who exercise a great deal of control over
litigation and settlement.
Some "characterize class actions in general, and antitrust class actions in
particular, as 'extortionate settlements. "'19 Some "speculate that[, especially]
in class actions [,] the potential for great liability based on the outcome of a
single trial can cause even innocent defendants to settle meritless claims [for
large sums] rather than risk a catastrophic-and errant-adverse decision."2o
Conversely, other "commentators claim that plaintiffs' class action
lawyers have incentive to 'sell out' the classes they represent. They note that
[plaintiffs'] lawyers generally do best on an hourly basis [if they settle] quickly,
even [if they do sol at a steep discount from the expected value of a case."2l
They also surmise that lawyers shortchange the class by seeking hard cash for
legal fees and "a less valuable form of compensation for the class, such as
coupons."22
Note the strong tension between these views. The first perspective
suggests that plaintiffs are likely to recover too much from defendants, and
the second suggests that plaintiffs are likely to recover too little from
defendants, especially in class actions. It is difficult to imagine both views

COURTING JUSTICE 252 (2004); id. at 333 ("Although the antitrust laws provide for treble
damages, most price-fixing class actions settle for some amount less than the actual overcharge. ").
18. Much of the analysis in this Part is based upon Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying
Conventional Wisdom: The Casefor Private Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REv. I, 11-16, 33-38 (2013).
19· [d. at 34.
20.
[d.
2 I.
[d.; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1354 (1995) ("Even in the absence of bad faith, suspect settlements result
in large measure because of the defendants' ability to shop for favorable settlement terms, either
by contacting multiple plaintiffs' attorneys or by inducing them to compete against each other.
At its worst, this process can develop into a reverse auction, with the low bidder among the
plaintiffs' attorneys winning the right to settle with the defendant."); Susan P. Koniak & George
M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1112 (1996) ("If the court uses the
'lodestar' method, which involves multiplying the number of hours worked by some hourly rate
and then adjusting further based on a risk factor, then class counsel can collude with defendants
and their lawyers by exaggerating or unnecessarily running up the class lawyer's hours.").
22. Davis & Lande, supra note 18, at 35.
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generally are correct. 2 3 How, then, can we know which ofthese points is likely
to predominate in practice?
The relevant empirical evidence is exceedingly thin, although the 60
cases in the Davis/Lande study help somewhat. While we cannot know
whether those cases settled for the "right" amount, plaintiffs recovered
approximately $500 million per case on average. 24 Defendants are unlikely to
settle for such large amounts unless there was a significant chance they
ultimately would lose on the merits. These cases also suggest that at least some
plaintiffs' attorneys do not sell out their class members entirely. Because the
empirical evidence is quite thin, we now tum to an analysis of incentives and
legal doctrine.
Professor Hovenkamp notes a key starting point in the analysis: "Most
lawsuits settle when each party has some prospect of winning or losing. The
settlement discounts these probabilities into a certain agreement immediately
rather than an uncertain outcome later. "25 In addition, it is extremely unlikely
for defendants to knowingly pay treble damages because, inter alia,
defendants rarely, if ever, pay prejudgment interest in antitrust cases. 26 And
given the long delay between a violation and resolution through trial or
settlement, the recovery is reduced significantly by this factor. Further,
defendants are rarely-if ever-held liable for various kinds of harms their
antitrust violations cause, including umbrella effects of market power and
allocative inefficiency effects of market power."7 Of course, often a private

23. It is possible for both views to be accurate. If the wrong plaintiffs recover---direct
purchasers, for instance, when indirect purchasers are the real victims-then private antitrust
enforcement could result in both excessive and insufficient compensation. We have, however,
seen no evidence that this occurs systematically.
24. Davis & Lande, supra note 10, at 1273 (noting that plaintiffs in those 60 cases recovered
between $33.8 billion and $35.8 billion).
25. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, SAN DIEGO L. REv.
(forthcoming 2015).
26. The antitrust remedy statute allows for prejudgment interest only in such unusual cases
where, for example, the court finds that defendant delayed in bad faith. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(l)
(2012). Prejudgment interest is rarely awarded in an antitrust case. On September II, 2014, the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey entered judgment for plaintiff and awarded
prejudgment interest-possibly for the first time in an antitrust case. Judgment in a Civil Action,
Avaya Inc. v. Telecom Labs, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-249o-JEI-KMW, 2014 WL 97335 (D.NJ. Sept. 11,
2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-<>4277 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2014). Avaya Inc. was ordered to pay
$62,613,052.10 in damages, calculated as $60 million dollars in treble damages from a $20 million
jury award, plus $2,613,052.10 in prejudgment interest. [d. Avaya Inc. appealed on Oct. 10, 2014.
Notice of Appeal, Avaya, No. 1:06-cv-249o-JEI-KMW, 2014 WL 97335 (D.NJ. Oct. 10,2014).
27. Market power produces allocative inefficiency-the deadweight loss welfare triangle. See
EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 277--92 (4th ed. 1982)
(defining allocative inefficiency and showing how it is created by monopoly pricing). Allocative
inefficiency often is significant empirically, but it apparently has never been awarded in an
antitrust case. See David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D. Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages for Consumer
Welfare Loss, 39 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 505, 505 (1991) ("The authors have been unable to locate any
antitrust case which has permitted recovery of damages for this consumer welfare loss."). Second,
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action will not make economic sense because the damages are too low and
the costs of litigation are too high. Victims in these cases might settle for a
fraction of their damages-or might not file at all.
Antitrust defendants likely have a significant advantage over plaintiffs in
settlement negotiations for other reasons. Plaintiffs may suffer in the short
term and defendants may benefit from delay, placing defendants at a
significant advantage in the settlement negotiations. Antitrust defendants
often are rich and powerful economic actors; they can exploit market power
to the detriment of the victims, who usually are in a more vulnerable position.
This disparity can affect the litigation and settlement process. Plaintiffs will
often lack the resources to tolerate the expense and disruption that litigation
entails, and be forced to settle for less than if they were able to wait for a final
verdict. 2s
There is no doubt that many defendants in antitrust cases are risk-averse,
especially when extremely large sums of money are involved. But the same is
true for plaintiffs and their attorneys, especially since many plaintiff cases are
class actions that are financed by the attorneys involved. Moreover, we might
market power can produce "umbrella" effects-the name given to higher prices charged by non·
violating members that were permitted or caused by the violation's supracompetitive prices. See
1 AREEDA& HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 'l[ 337.3, at 42g-32 (Supp. 1992). This factor also is never,
or virtually never, awarded. [d.
Moreover, there are several additional types of harms typically caused by antitrust violations.
These include the uncompensated value of plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the case and the costs
of the judicial system. In addition, firms with market power may have less incentive to innovate
or to offer as wide an array of non-price variety or quality options. Alternatively, one could argue
that cartel members will have more funds to use for socially desirable innovation. We know of no
evidence, however, that these innovation effects are significant empirically. The price fixers' own
legal costs, the disruption in their own efficiency as a result of sanctions litigation, and any harm
to their corporate reputation, by contrast, are not "harms to others" from collusion, and therefore
should not be included in the optimal deterrence analysis. For an extended discussion of these
issues, see Roben H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. LJ.
115,15 1 (1993)·
2S. Plaintiffs' counsel in antitrust cases generally proceed on a contingent basis, spending
their time without immediate payment and incurring litigation costs on behalf of their clients.
They receive no compensation or reimbursement if they lose. Plaintiffs' attorneys in effect
provide an interest-free loan, albeit a voluntary one. As a result, plaintiff attorneys tend to obtain
the best return on their time if they settle cases quickly, even for a relatively small amount.
Defense attorneys, in contrast, are paid by the hour. Therefore, they fare best in protracted
litigation. Defendants also may often be better situated to oversee their attorneys than the clients
of plaintiffs' attorneys if the case is a class action.
Two assumptions tend to underlie the claim that antitrust defendants often settle cases for
more than the merits make appropriate. First is the claim that defendants in class actions in
general-and in antitrust class actions in particular-are unduly risk-averse and are willing to pay
a premium to avoid the possibility of losing at trial. Second is the suggestion that antitrust
defendants pay significantly higher litigation costs than antitrust plaintiffs, placing the defendants
at a disadvantage in settlement negotiations. To the extent these assumptions are true,
defendants in antitrust class actions should feel compelled to settle even meritless cases for
substantial sums. See Davis & Lande, supra note IS, at 37-39 (describing the incentives for both
sides to sue and settle in antitrust class action suits).
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expect that the decisionmakers for the plaintiffs-often their attorneys-are
even more risk-averse than defendants. We know of no reason why defendants
would be more risk-averse than plaintiffs,29 Moreover, defense counsel
themselves may not be overly risk-averse. They have no direct stake in the
outcome of trial and, given the extraordinarily high rate of settlement in class
action cases, likely feel comfortable they can settle eventually if their pretrial
efforts prove unsuccessful.3 0
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts in recent years have also made
it easier for defendants to prevail when they move to dismiss, move for
summary judgment, and when they oppose class certification.3' These factors
all tend to significantly lower the settlement amount.
One legal settlement principle seems worthy of special mention: the
Grinnell doctrine.3' As Professor Leslie has documented after the U.S. Court

29. Evidence that defendants regularly settle class actions for large sums simply to avoid the
risk of an erroneous, catastrophic loss and also for the judicial assertions that class certification
coerces defendants into settling is questionable. See, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249
F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, there is an odd asymmetry in the judicial concern about vulnerable corporationswhat about victims who are unable to pursue their legal rights against large corporations simply
because their individual claims are not large enough to warrant litigation? None of this establishes
that critics of private litigation and class actions are wrong and surely some of their anecdotes are
correct. It does suggest, however, that their claims have not been proven on a systematic basis. See
Davis & Lande, supra note 18, at 38-40.
30. Moreover, while commentators sometimes suggest that litigation costs fall
disproportionately on antitrust defendants, the evidence on this issue is at least mixed. These
costs may well fall as heavily on antitrust plaintiffs. Shifting the focus from the incentives before
the parties to those before the attorneys reveals a third reason to believe settlements in private
antitrust actions are likely to be too small. As noted above, plaintiffs' attorneys generally receive
a contingency fee as a percentage of the recovery. They also have to wait until a recovery to obtain
any compensation for the time they have expended and the costs they have incurred. In addition,
there is evidence that plaintiffs in large cases actually incur higher litigation costs than defendants.
This may well be especially true in antitrust class actions, where plaintiffs must pay economic
experts to gather data and analyze an industry that defendants know relatively well.
None of this analysis is meant to generally impugn the ethics or integrity of attorneys in
antitrust cases. No doubt most attorneys abide by their ethical obligation to place their clients'
interests above their own. We should not jump from predictions to conclusions. The incentive
for defense attorneys paid by the hour is to drag out litigation and undertake unnecessary tasks,
and no doubt these unethical practices sometimes occur. But we should develop evidence
concerning how often this occurs before we attribute improper conduct to defense attorneys in
general. And we should do the same regarding plaintiffs' attorneys who might sometime sell out
their class. But to the extent we look at the incentives of attorneys, they reinforce the conclusion
that recoveries in private antitrust cases are apt to be too small rather than too large. For citations,
see Davis & Lande, supra note 18, at 37.
31. See generally Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics
of Procedure, 17 GEO. MAsON L. REv. 969 (2010); Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which
Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETITION POL'y INT'L 59, 59
(2007) (surveying every antitrust case decided from 1998 to 2007, and concluding that "[tlhe
U.S. Supreme Court has now decided 14 antitrust cases in a row in favor of the defendant").
32. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).

NOT TREBLE DAMAGES
of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 1974 Grinnell opinion, "courts evaluating
the reasonableness of a proposed class action settlement almost uniformly
decline to consider the trebling of antitrust damages."33 However, despite its
longevity, "[ t] he very origin of the rule to disregard trebling is founded on an
apparent misreading of the law. "34 As Professor Leslie shows:
Despite the fact that trebling is mandatory, federal courts
generally refuse to consider the trebling of antitrust damages when
evaluating proposed settlements in antitrust class action
litigation .... The Second Circuit in its influential decision opined
that it would be "improper" to consider the fact that any damages
following trial would be trebled "when computing a base recovery
figure which will be used to measure the adequacy of a settlement
offer." ...
Subsequent courts followed Grinnell en masse. 35
Because almost every meritorious damages case settles, Professor Leslie
concludes "that courts have already effectively detrebled antitrust damages."3 6
Perhaps for all these reasons, the courts rarely reject proposed antitrust
settlements as being too low. When asked about the court rejecting the
proposed $324 million settlement in the recent High-Tech Employee cartel case,
Professor Daniel Crane thoughtfully responded: "I cannot recall a judge
saying in a class-action case that the amount of settlement is too low and you
need to go back and go for broke at trial[] .... This is very striking."37
Just because most successful cases settle for relatively low amounts does
not mean that plaintiffs rarely recover significant damage amounts. Professor
Connor's analysis of over 100 international cartels prosecuted between 1990
and 2008 found a total of $29 billion in announced private settlements in

Leslie, supra note 3, at 1020.
[d. at 1025.
35. [d. at 1018-19 (quoting Grinnell, 495 F.2d at 458).
36. [d. at 1009.
37. David Streitfeld, Court Rejects Deal on Hiring in Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/technology/settlement.rejected.in-silicon-valley-hiringcase.html (quoting Professor Daniel Crane) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33.
34.

In April, lawyers for the 64,000 class members and the companies reached a
tentative deal. But the judge said the money did not fall "within the range of
reasonableness." Mter the plaintiffs' lawyers took their 25 percent cut, the
settlement would have given about $4,000 to every member of the class. Judge
Koh said that she believed the case was stronger than that, and that the plaintiffs'
lawyers were taking the easy way out by settling .... While judges often fine-tune
proposed class-action settlements, it is unusual for one to be entirely thrown out in
favor of a trial.
[d.; see also Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Approval Settlements with Adobe,
Apple, Google, and Intel, Inre High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2014
WL 3917126 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).
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U.S. cases.3 8 The only other aggregate estimate of which we are aware is the
Davis/Lande study of 60 large private cases that settled after 1990. Twentyfive actions filed against large cartels produced between $9.2 billion and
$10.6 billion in cash payments, and all 60 cases together produced cash
payments of $33.8 to $35.8 billion.s9
Are these settlements for "high" or for "low" amounts? The key
information that is missing, of course, is the percentage of the violators'
overcharges that these cases settled for. Thanks to Professor Connor's cartel
database we can now test these suppositions.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SETTLEMENTS: THE RECOVERY RATIO

The Private International Cartels ("PIC") database contains information
on more than 1000 cartels discovered since 1990.40 We searched it to find
cartels for which (1) there was a completed U.S. damages suit; and (2) a
disinterested evaluator calculated the cartel's U.S. overcharges. We did not
include any overcharge estimates prepared by parties working on the cases,
or their lawyers or economists, or any subsequent estimate that we knew to be
published by interested parties. 41 Economists prepared most of the relevant
71 overcharge calculations as part of their scholarly research and published
the calculations in peer-reviewed journals, book chapters, or posted working
papers. 42
We limited our sample to cartels for which we could identify the United
States sales during the allegedly illegal periods. 43 We only included the
damages secured in private cases filed in the United States. We included
damages paid to both direct and indirect purchasers (but not criminal fines).
We limited our sample to cartels that were originally discovered after January

john M. Connor, Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed: Private International Cartels from I990 to
at 51 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. og-06, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1467310.
39. These figures do not include the value of products, coupons, or discounts. Davis &
Lande, supra note 10, at 1272.
40. For this Essay, the August 30, 2014 version was employed. For a description of the PIC
and a discussion of sources and methods, see generally john M. Connor, The Private
International Cartels (PIC) Data Set: Guide and Summary Statistics, 1990-2013 (Aug. 9, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478271.
41. john M. Connor, Cartel Overcharges, in 26 THE LAw AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS
249, 285-87 (James Langenfeld ed., 2014). For a fuller discussion of the sources and a descriptive
analysis of the overcharges data, see id. at 268-312, 316-21.
42. For example, for the Private Equity Buyout cartel, we employed the undercharge estimate
prepared from a complex econometric model published in a distinguished academicjournal. See
Micah S. Officer, Oguzhan Ozbas & Berk A. Sensoy, Club Deals in Leveraged Buyouts, 98 J. FIN.
ECON. 214, 237-40 (2010).
43. Obtaining affected commerce is often difficult, but is necessary because many published
overcharge figures are given in percentage terms.
38.
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1990 and all defendants' settlements amounts were announced.44 We used
nominal dollars: we did not adjust for the fact that the overcharges occur years
before payments in damages actions.
We combined multiple suits by different victims or classes of victims of
the same cartel, including opt-out cases, into one "case." Indeed, even the
definition of a "cartel" is open to dispute or judgment. For example, was the
international Vitamins cartel one huge interconnected "super cartel," was it
three large cartels that affected a differing array of vitamins and formed and
waned over time (because there were three separate damages cases filed), or
was it actually 16 separate cartels as the European Commission and
economists would prefer to treat them? There is no easy way to resolve these
issues and reasonable people could differ as to the answer.45 Counting the 16
vitamins cartels as one observation or "case," we identified 71 cartel cases for
which we could find the necessary information.
To summarize the results, we present data on the Recovery Ratio, the
amount recovered by plaintiffs divided by the amount overcharged. 46 A
Recovery Ratio of 1.0 (or lOO%) would indicate full disgorgement of the
cartel's illegal profits, a Ratio of 3.0 (300%) would signal treble damages
recovered, and so forth.
A Recovery Ratio Example: Lysine
The global Lysine cartel operated in the United States from 1992 to
1995, generating affected sales of $495 million. A posted economic
study concluded that overcharges were $80 million. Direct
purchasers recovered $55 million and indirect purchasers recovered
$27.5 million.47
The Recovery Ratio = ($55 + $27.5)/$80 =

1.03

44. It is not unusual for many years to elapse between the filing of the first case against a
cartel and the resolution of the last case against them. The most recent settlement in our sample
is Private Equity Buyouts, which was filed in December 2007. The first two defendants agreed to
settle on June 11, 2014 and the last in August 2014. See Mike Spector, Buyout Firms Settle Suit
Alleging Collusion over Deals, WALL ST.]. (Aug. 7, 2014,6:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
blacks ton e-kkr-tpg-to-pay-com bined-3 25-million-to-settle-c1u b-deals-Iawsui t-1407 4261 28.
45. For an analysis of the issues in the Vitamins cartel, see generally John M. Connor, The
Great Global Vitamins Conspiracies, 1985-1999 (May 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
availablR at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=885968. See also In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.2oo4).
46. The authors thank Professor Herbert Hovenkamp for suggesting this felicitous term.
47. John M. Connor, Global Cartels &dux: The Lysine Antitrust Litigation (I996), in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 336, 348-57 (John E. Kwoka,
Jr. & Lawrence]. White eds., 6th ed. 2013).
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Our analysis of the 71 cartel cases shows that the victims of only 14 cartels
enjoyed Recovery Ratios of 100% or higher, and only seven received more
than 200%. The rest-the victims in 57 cases-failed to recover the amount
the cartels initially overcharged them.
Overall, the average (i.e., the simple arithmetic mean average) Recovery
Ratio is 66%.4 8 However, when one plots the probability densities of the
settlement/ overcharges percentages, it is immediately apparent that these
ratios look nothing like the usual bell-shaped curve of a "normal" distribution.
In fact, the distribution is highly skewed, with the number of very small
percentages much greater than the number of large percentages (see
Appendix). Under such circumstances, the median average is a better
representation of central tendency than is the mean average. And the median
Recovery Ratio is considerably lower, 37%.49
We note that the 71 cartels vary greatly in size, both in terms of sales and
dollar overcharges. The mean and median averages treat each cartel
observation as though they are of equal size. A third representation of central
tendency-and the one we prefer-is the weighted average. The weighted
average Recovery Ratio (a figure that weights the settlement/overcharges
percentages according to their dollar overcharges) is 19%.5
Private damages cases are believed to be on a surer footing if they are
preceded by criminal convictionsY Plaintiffs in civil cases can introduce these
convictions as prima facie evidence of collusion. Moreover, evidence gleaned
from the earlier cases provides details about cartel conduct that helps build
superior empirical models to estimate damages. Finally, the Department of
Justice ("DO]") may tend to prosecute cartels with the highest damages. Thus,
followership advantages ought to confer higher Recovery Ratios ceteris paribus.
To see whether followership explains the height of average Recovery Ratios,
we divided the 71 cartel cases into three groups: (1) 36 suits that followed
successful U.S. government convictions;5 2 (2) six that followed findings of
price-fixing violations by civil European Union ("EU") administrative
antitrust authorities,53 and (3) 29 non-follow-on damages suits.54 As expected,
0

48. We have rounded off the figure in the text. The calculated figure was 65.98%.
49. The calculated figure was 36.73 %.
50. The calculated figure was 19.45%.
51. Connor, supra note 9, at 10-12.
52. All but two cartels were convicted criminally by the U.S. DO]. The two exceptions were
Buspirone and Anti-Anxiety Drugs, which were the subjects of detailed investigations and condemnation
by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). See In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205
F.RD. 369 (D.D.C. 2002); In reBristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. C-4076 (F.T.C. 2004).
53. These suits followed European Commission decisions that fined the cartels for collusive
conduct in the European Union ("EU"). Cartel participants typically sold the same products in
the both the United States and the EU, and the European Commission decisions often suggested
that the collusive conduct extended outside of the EU's economic space.
54. It can be an extremely difficult and controversial matter to classify cases into one of
these groups, and sometimes reasonable people can differ as to these classifications. Moreover,
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the mean and median average Recovery Ratios are highest for the follow-on
suits, where the cartels were previously convicted by the U.S. antitrust
authorities (81.2% and 52.4 %, respectively). The average Recovery Ratios are
much lower for the non-follow-on suits (54.8% and 22.7%). Prior adverse EU
decisions provided the least assistance by far: the mean and median Recovery
Ratios are 26.8% and 8.7%.
The figures presented in this Part are subject to the caveats noted
throughout this Essay, and the "true" figures could be different for many
reasons. 55 For example, although we attempted to include every opt-out case,
surely we missed some, especially smaller opt-out cases. Unless we had reason
to disbelieve the parties' information, we accepted their statements about the
settlements' value. 56 Similarly, some cases yielded products, coupons, or
discounts that were too difficult for us to quantify easily, so we ignored their
possible value. And, of course, some of these products or discounts had
different values to the plaintiffs than to the defendants, and reasonable
people could differ about which is the best measure of value. Similarly, some
settlements had non-monetary value, such as injunctive relief. And,
fundamentally, we relied upon the overcharge estimate of the neutral scholar
who studied the case. The only exceptions were when ajudge or jury made a
finding that, for example, accepted the estimate of plaintiffs' expert. On the
rare occasion that this happened, we allowed court decisions to trump
economists' findings.
The highest Recovery Ratio (expressed in nominal dollars) in our sample
was secured in the EPDM cartel case: 365%.57 It is of course puzzling why a
cartel would ever settle for treble damages, let alone for a higher sum. There
are several possible explanations. First, the calculations shown in this Essay
make no adjustments for the time value of money. Since the overcharges often

sometimes the publicly available information does not permit one to determine whether private
actions were follow-up cases to government actions.
55. All three of the measures of central tendency just discussed are point estimates from a
sample. Our sample of cartels is about half of the entire population of all international cartels
discovered operating in the United States after January 1990. An important consideration in this
Essay is to ask to what extent any of these averages is representative of the "true" or population
average. The usual procedure is to construct a confidence intetval. A confidence band or confidence
interoal is a pair of numbers within which a statistic calculated from a sample (e.g., the mean
average) can be reasonably expected to occur for the entire population at some chosen level of
confidence, such as 90% or 95%. Unfortunately, because the distribution of settlement
percentages is abnormal, this method is unavailable. SeeJEFFREYM. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUcrORY
ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 138,825 (5th ed. 2012).
56. We certainly are aware that parties sometimes have incentives to distort the value of
their settlement. Plaintiffs' attorneys, for example, could have an incentive to exaggerate
settlement values that include discounts, coupons, or products in the hope that this will cause a
court to award them a higher fee.
57.
SeeJohn M. Connor, Price-Fixing Overcharges: Revised 3rd Edition 303 (Am. Antitrust Inst.,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=2400780; see also In re
Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 256 F.R.D. 82 (D. Conn. 2009).
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arise many years before the payouts in the private cases, adjusting the payment
using net present value to the year the settlement was made will result in a
smaller payment number. Consequently, the final payment/overcharge ratio
will be smaller. Both the settlement amount and the damages ought to be
expressed in the dollars of the same year. To take the EPDM example,
adjusting the 365 % Recovery Ratio for the time value of money reduces the
ratio to 165.5 %-well below treble damages. 58 Adjusting all the other cartels'
ratios would result in smaller ratios as well.
Second, the statutory maximum actually is treble damages, plus
reasonable attorneys' fees, plus reasonable expert witness costs.59 Perhaps the
legal and expert witness fees, in addition to treble damages, could total 365 %
of the overcharges. Or, it is possible the parties involved in the case
miscalculated the cartel's actual damages, or disagreed with the case
evaluation overcharge results in the report we utilized in our calculations. 6o
Conversely, in four of the 71 cartel cases the Recovery Ratios were less
than 1%, in 12 they were less than 10%, and another eight were between 10%
and 20%. Although there are many reasons for such low settlements, some
that might make us sympathetic to plaintiffs and others that might make us
sympafuetic to defendants, these results certainly are grounds for reflection.
It should be stressed that these results apply only to overcharges and sales
made in the United States. Most of these cartels operated worldwide. Thus,
for example, we calculated that the U.S. Recovery Ratio of the Vitamins "super
cartel" is 246% (expressed in dollars not adjusted for inflation). Our
calculations did not, however, consider the Vitamin cartel's overcharges or
sales outside of the United States. If this cartel were evaluated on a worldwide
basis, when all of its payments in private suits are added to the fines it paid
worldwide, and this total is compared to the collusive overcharges it was able
to enjoy worldwide during the period of the alleged conspiracy, overall the
Vitamins cartel still made a profit. 61

58. To find the net present value of the settlement amount of the $74 million overcharge
made on average in the year 2000, we made a conventional assumption in financial economics
that the direct buyers (manufacturers of plastic products) would have earned a rate equal to the
prime rate of interest plus one percentage point, compounded for nine years. This raises the
overcharge to a net present value in the year 2000 to $129.1 million. To calculate the Recovery
Ratio accurately, both the numerator and denominator must be expressed in dollars from the
same year. For convenience, we chose 2010, the settlement year. Then we used the Consumer
Price Index to inflate the overcharge in year 2000 dollars to year 2010 dollars; the latter is $163.3
million. The Recovery Ratio is $270.2/$163.3 = 165.5%.
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
60. For example, the evaluation of the EPDM synthetic rubber cartel case calculated the
cartel's United States overcharges at $74 million. Perhaps defendants feared that plaintiffs might
be able to prove damages of $100 million or more. Perhaps these defendants were unusually riskaverse and were working off of imperfect information and so they (perhaps mistakenly) settled
for what turned out to be a high level of damages.
61. See Connor, supra note 45, at 149-50.
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One caveat is that the affected sales data were estimated by the first
author. 62 Some of the sales figures are exceedingly precise and most are based
on reliable base numbers, but some rely on the best available resources on
market sales found in business libraries. As an example of a precise estimate,
plaintiffs' counsel in the Private Equity Buyouts case provided the transaction
values of the nine leveraged buyouts at issue in the case; these data are fully
public figures. 63 The more reliable sales data began with the cartel's sales as
revealed by government prosecutors for one or a few years; then total sales
were estimated with a reasonable growth rate over the collusive years.
However, the Private International Cartels ("PIC") data takes note of sales
estimates that are judged to be less reliable.
Of the 71 observations, 30 were flagged as having less reliable sales
estimates. For example, in Refrigerant Compressors, sales data was obtained for
all such compressors, but the private suit limited sales to only compressors of
one horsepower or less, and the latter was not available. 64 Thus, sales for this
cartel may be overestimated, so a dollar overcharge figure will underestimate
the settlement percentage. To investigate the extent of the bias created by
unsure sales data, we recalculated the average Recovery Ratio for the
remaining 42 cartels. The median average rises to 42%, the weighted mean

52. Another problem we mention in passing is the difficulty of deciding on the appropriate
sales concept in some cases. For example, in a few international cartels in recent years,
participants have used energy or security surcharges to raise prices of air cargo or air passenger
services. The conventional view is that the relevant price increase was in the total charge for air
cargo shipments or airline tickets. However, one might take the view that it is the surcharge itself
that was affected, not the charge as a whole. In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys when announcing
settlements in the International Air Transportation Surcharge case boasted that their $200 million
recovery was 33 % of the fuel surcharge levied on passengers. Christine Caulfield, BA, Vi~n Settle
Price-Fixing Class Actionfor $2ooM, LAw350 (Feb. 15, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law350.com/
articles/ 4 7240/ba-virgin-settle-price-fixing·dass-action-for-200m ("Each ticket purchaser can
recover one-third of the fuel levy, [attorney Michael] Hausfeld said."); see also In re Int'l Air
Transp. Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 577 Fed. App'x 711 (2014). However, when gauged against
ticket sales, recovery was 6% to 13 % (assuming the average ticket was priced between $500 and
$800 for the 3 to 4 million buyers). See id.
63. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 3g-62, Police & Fire Retirement Sys. v.
Apollo Global Mgmt., No. 107-CV-12388, 2008 WL 5679238 (D. Mass. Aug. 25, 2008);Jonathan
Stempel, Goldman, Bain 10 Pay $I2I Million in LBO Collusion Settlement, REUTERS Oun. II, 2014,
7:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-goldman-bain-to-paY-121-million-in-Ibo-collusionsettlement-20 14-1 I.
54. In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 647, 551-52, 659 (E.D.
Mich. 2011). The government prosecutions in the United States and Brazil make no mention of
horsepower. See, e.g., Third Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re Refrigerant Compressors
Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 647 (No. 2:09-02042),2012 WL 9494136; Plea Agreement at 2,
United States v. Embraco N. Am., No. 2:lo-CR-20577-PJD-RSW (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2010),
available at http://wwwJustice.gov/atr/cases/f263200/263223.pdf (defining the market as
"household and light commercial compressors sold in the United States and elsewhere").
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average rises to 31 %, and the simple mean average falls to 62%.65 Because the
differences in averages between the two samples are small, the less reliable
sales estimates did not significantly bias our results. 66
Notwithstanding the fact that the Vitamins defendants were large and
paid high overcharge amounts in the cases filed against them,67 on average
plaintiffs tend to be rewarded relatively poorly in the biggest cases. 68 For
example, the cartels with the ten smallest U.S. sales have median overcharges
of 81 % of affected sales; examples of highly successful cases in the group are
PVC Window Coverings,69 Nitrile Butadiene Rubber,70 and Buspirone. 71 By contrast,
the ten largest cartels have median settlement of 11 % of sales. Correlation
analysis confirms the inverse relationshipY
V.

ANTITRUST'S NEED FOR MULTIPLE DAMAGES

The antitrust statutes provide that violations give rise to automatic treble
damages plus "reasonable attorney's fee[s] ."73 The legislative history74 and
case law75 indicate that compensation is a goal, perhaps the dominant goal, of

65. This confirms our suspicions that either early sales estimates tend to be too broadly
defined or that prosecutors often calVe away some products or geographic areas when defining
the cartelized market.
66. That is, errors made on the high side were mostly compensated by errors on the low side.
67. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
68. We are not aware that this finding has been hypothesized in the cartel literature.
69. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Orime Pays, 34
CARDozo L. REv. 427, 474 (2012).
70. Commission Decision 38/628, In re Nitrile Butadiene Rubber, 2009 OJ. (C 86/7) (EC),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriselV:0j.C_.2009.086.01.
0007·0 I. ENG.
71. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 211 F.R.D. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
72. The Pearson correlation between sales and the settlement percentage is r= -{).095. The
rank correlation is stronger, r= -().278.
73· 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
74. In the legislative debates, Senator Richard Coke complained about a bill that would
have provided only for double damages:
How would a citizen who has been plundered in his family consumption of sugar by
the sugar trust ... recover his damages under that clause? It is simply an impossible
remedy offered him .... [Hlow could the consumers of the articles produced by
these trusts, the great mass of our people-the individuals-go about showing the
damages they had suffered? How would they establish the damage which they had
sustained so as to get ajudgment under this bill? I do not believe they could do it.
21 CONGo REc. 2615 (1890) (statement of Sen. Richard Coke). Representative Edwin Webb stated
that the damages provision "opens the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured
by those who violate the antitrust laws, and gives the injured party ample damages for the wrong
suffered." 51 CONGo REc. 9073 (1914) (statement of Rep. Edwin Webb). He also stated that "we
are liberalizing the procedure in the courts in order to give the individual who is damaged the
right to get his damages anywhere-anywhere you can catch the offender." Id. at 16,274'
75. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 191,211-36 (2008).
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antitrust's damages remedy.7 6 In addition, the statutes were primarily aimed
at avoiding wealth transfers from purchasers to firms with market power
caused by this market power-which is analogous to a compensation goal.
The congressional decision to award treble damages certainly could lead one
to conclude that two-thirds of antitrust damages were meant for some purpose
other than compensation, such as deterrence. However, it is possible that even
the "extra" damages were intended to compensate victims for such unawarded
items as prejudgment interest, or damages that are difficult to measure, such
as umbrella effects of market power or the victims' time spent pursuing a
remedy.77
Indeed, when these factors are considered, antitrust's nominal "treble
damages" probably are only approximately single damages. 78
Although it is possible that compensation is the only goal of the antitrust
damages remedy, "[v] irtually every analysis of antitrust damages issues
assumes that ... [at least a purpose, and perhaps] the entire purpose ... is
deterrence."79 Many scholars believe that the primary purpose of the

76. "The language of [s] ection 4 of the Clayton Act permitting a private plaintiff to recover
three times the damages 'by him sustained' suggests rather strongly that compensation of victims,
rather than deterrence of violators, is the principal goal of private damage actions under the
antitrust laws." SULLIVAN, HOVENKAMP, SHELANSKI & LESLIE, supra note 2, at 161.
77. Lande, supra note 27, at 123. If compensation"is the purpose for the damages remedy,
then the damages should include every "relatively predictable" i~ury that reaches everyone
except the defendants, including "the wealth transferred from consumers to the violator(s)"; "the
allocative inefficiency effects felt by society," both direct and indirect; attorney's fees for the
plaintiffs and compensation for plaintiffs' time spent litigating; and judicial costs. [d. at 124; see
also Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAsTINGsLJ. 65, 94-95 (1982) [hereinafter Lande, Wealth Transfers]
(citations omitted).
A summary of comments by legislators suggests congressional intent: "Congress was well
aware ... that higher prices transfer wealth from consumers to firms with market power." Robert
H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429,
499 (1988 ). The debates strongly suggest that Congress condemned trusts and monopolies for
exactly this reason. In one example, Senator Sherman called overcharges by monopolies
"extortion which makes the people poor," and "extorted wealth." Congressman Coke called them
"robbery." Representative Heard said the trusts, "without rendering the slightest equivalent," have
"stolen untold millions from the people." Congressman Wilson complained that a particular trust
"robs the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other." Representative Fithian said
the trusts were "impoverishing" the people through "robbery." Senator Hoar said a monopoly's
prices were "a transaction the direct purpose of which is to extort from the community ... wealth
which ought to be generally diffused over the whole community." Senator George complained
that monopolies "aggregate to themselves great enormous wealth by extortion which makes the
people poor." Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra, at 94-95.
78. Lande, supra note 27, at 119.
79. Id. at 124; see also Connor & Lande, supra note 69, at 431-33. In the Sherman Act
debates Representative Webb stated, "[u]nder the civil remedies any man throughout the United
States, hundreds and thousands, can bring suit in the various jurisdictions, and thus the offender
will begin to open his eyes because you are threatening to take money out of his pocket." 51
CONGo REc. 16,275 (1914) (statement of Rep. Edwin Webb). See discussion of these debates in
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1,21-30 (1989).
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underlying substantive provisions is to enhance economic efficiency,80 which
typically is the goal of optimal-deterrence approaches. St
The antitrust community usually uses the deterrence framework
developed by Professor William Landes. s, Landes showed that, to achieve
optimal deterrence, the damages should be equal to the violation's expected
"net harm to others"83 divided by the probability of detection and proof of the
violation. 84 As an example of how this approach would operate in practice,
one should multiply the "net harm to others" by the inverse ofthe probability
of detection and conviction. s5 Despite government efforts to eliminate cartels,

80. Robert Bork analyzed the relevant legislative history and concluded that "[t]he whole
task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare."
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 (1978). For
additional citations and analysis, see Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 75, at 193-g5.
81. See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violotions, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652,
655 (1983) ("[D]eterrence alone is not the aim of penalties. The purpose of penalties ... is to
deter inefficient offenses, not efficient ones.").
82. ld. at 656. An alternative analysis of optimal anti-<:artel policies has grown in the past ten
years. See, e.g., Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers.
Should Price Fixers Still Go to Prison?, in 282 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 81, 82 (Vivek Ghosal &Johan Stennek eds., 2007) ("This paper discusses
the issue in the light of two major recent innovationsL] ... leniency programs and reward schemes
for whistleblowers."). This perspective focuses on policies like corporate or individual leniency
programs that will destabilize cartels that are already formed. See id. at 114-18. Thus, policy
prescriptions arising from this body of scholarship are ex post, seeid. at 114-15, and far from being
contradictory, they are supplementary to the ex ante policies we examine in the present Essay.
83. Landes, supra note 81, at 656. The logic underlying the "net harm to others" optimal
deterrence standard was explained clearly by Professors Breit & Elzinga:
Assume that a potential cartelist calculates that joining a horizontal price-fixing
conspiracy will increase his profits by $100 million. He also is aware that the
deadweight loss imposed on society by his activity is $50 million. If the expected
value of the fine imposed is the entire amount of consumers' surplus ($150 million)
would he enter the cartel? He would do so if he believed that the cartel would be
accompanied by cost reductions to him greater than $50 million. If the cost saving
were, say, $60 million, he would still enter the price-fixing conspiracy because he
would know that his fine would be $100 million (his cartel profits) plus $50 million
(the deadweight loss) leaving him $10 million more revenue than would be the case
ifhe did not enter the cartel. In this case the cartel is accompanied by cost reductions
greater than the deadweight loss it imposes on society. On efficiency grounds, it
should be permitted.
WIlLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALlY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 12
(1986).
84. See Landes, supra note 81, at 656--57. This assumes risk neutrality and makes other
common assumptions. ld. at 653-54. "Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives for
would-be violators when unlawful acts are not certain to be prosecuted successfully. Indeed, some
multiplication is necessary even when most of the liability-<:reating acts are open and
notorious. The defendants may be able to conceal facts that are essential to liability." Frank H.
Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 454 (1985)'
85. Connor & Lande, supra note 69, at 433.
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evidence continues to show that many cartels are still in operation. For ideal
deterrence, sanctions should be more than a cartel's "net harms to others" in
order to account for this less than 100% probability that the government will
find a cartel and that the cartel will be later convicted. If a cartel expected to
overcharge by $100 but only had a 33 % chance it would be discovered and
then convicted, the sanctions should slightly exceed $300. Without
multiplying a firm's "net harm to others" by the likelihood that the firm will
actually pay for that harm, firms will not be deterred from violating antitrust
law. 86
For cartels, the relevant literature indicates there is a 20% to 25%
probability that they will be detected and convicted. 87 Most analysts of both
the Chicago and post-Chicago schools of antitrust accept these principles. 88
From a compensation perspective, these damages should of course be
awarded to the victims of the anticompetitive behavior. From a deterrence
perspective, however, these damages could instead be awarded to the state as
fines. The United States has of course chosen a mixed antitrust remedies
system, one that awards nominally trebled damages (which, as noted earlier,
do not account for all of the losses) to victims, and also imposes fines and
other sanctions. As the authors have shown, however, the totality of the
current remedies system is inadequate to achieve optimal deterrence, at least
for cartels. 89
The precise optimal multiplier certainly might well be different for
different types of antitrust offenses. For example, cartels are hidden because
price fixing is per se illegal, and in part for this reason a large multiplier is
necessary. Moreover, there is general agreement that collusion IS
86. [d. at 433-34. The continued high number of DO] grand juries and the recent DO]
success rate in the courts also suggests that many cartels still exist. As of 2013 (the most recent
year for which data was available), the DO] had 62 pending grand jury investigations. ANTITRUST
DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF ANTITRUST, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2004-2013, at 4,
available at http://wwwJustice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.pdf.
87. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POL'y
INT'L 3,7-8 (2010). Optimal deterrence should focus upon the actual expectations of members
of the cartels being deterred, not upon what has happened to similar cartels. We would like to
know, for example, how much they expect to raise prices and how often would-be carte lists take
into account the possible legal consequences of their actions-expectations that are impossible
to ascertain. What we can calculate is how much overall cartels have raised prices historically and
how often and how much they have been sanctioned. We can use this information as proxies for
the relevant expectations. Essentially, we are forced to use a general deterrence approach because
a specific deterrence approach is not possible. Connor & Lande, supra note 69, at 434-35.
88. See the discussion in Lande, supra note 27, at 161-68. Despite the general
acknowledgement of the superiority of the Landes approach, many highly respected scholars
instead focus upon the gain to the lawbreakers, perhaps because it is simpler to observe or
calculate. For a recent example, see Gregory ]. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 5 EUR. COMPETITION]' 19,28-31 (2009). For an insightful analysis,
see Wouter P.J. Wils, optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 183,
190-93 (2006).
89. See Connor & Lande, supra note 69, at 476-79.
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anticompetItlVe, and there is less fear that high cartel fines could deter
procompetitive behavior that is close to the margin of legality. However,
cartels can also be the subject of corporate fines as well as fines and prison for
the executives involved, so the damages in private cases do not have to provide
all the necessary deterrence.
By contrast, many other types of antitrust violations involve relatively
public conduct, so detection can be relatively easy. Even in monopolization
cases, however, many of the issues crucial to liability-did the defendant price
above or below average variable cost? What is the relevant market? Does the
defendant have monopoly power?-are difficult to ascertain. In fact, these
issues often are more difficult for plaintiffs to prove than many of the most
important questions at issue in the liability stage of most collusion cases,
including the crucial issue of whether defendants fixed prices. It is much
easier to show that a discovered cartel has violated the antitrust laws than a
discovered monopoly, so an extremely high multiplier might be appropriate
for these cases as well.
Thus, the optimal damages multipliers will be different for different types
of offenses. Nevertheless, because even relatively public violations are difficult
to prove, from a compensation or-especially-from a deterrence
perspective, antitrust violations should give rise to a damages multiplier that
is greater than one. As our calculations in Part IV have shown, however, few
antitrust settlements achieve this goal.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Victims of only 14 of the 71 cartels (20%) we studied had Recovery Ratios
above 100%. Of these, only seven (10%) received at least double damages.
The rest-the victims in 57 cases-received less than their initial damages,
and 12 received less than 10% of their damages. Three averages may be
calculated. First, the median Recovery Ratio is 37%. However, because the
distribution of the Recovery Ratio is so skewed, the weighted mean (a figure
that weights the settlements according to their overcharges) is much lower
(19%) than the unweighted mean Ratio of66% (which gives equal weights to
the cartels that operated in large markets and those that operated in small
markets). Plaintiffs are generally rewarded relatively poorly in the biggest
cases.
Not surprisingly, damages actions that follow adverse legal enforcement
by the DOlor the Federal Trade Commission result in higher average
Recovery Ratios than non-follow-on settlements. The variation in the ratios
among cartels is large, but we do not fully understand the reasons for the
disparities in recoveries. Future empirical studies might investigate whether
the number and types of defendants,90 the size of fines imposed, the presence

go. For example, we suspect that Recovery Ratios will be different for direct purchasers than
for indirect purchasers.
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of an immunized amnesty applicant,9 1 the length of the civil proceedings, or
other measurable factors can explain the variation in Recovery Ratios. Other
determinants of variation in Recovery Ratios (e.g., changes in the stringency
of class certification rules, sweetheart deals by plaintiffs' lawyers) may be more
difficult to measure.
As Part III showed, antitrust damage awards should be significantly
greater than the actual damages caused by Violations. In an earlier article, one
of the authors showed that even on those relatively unusual occasions where
the parties do not settle and the victims do receive nominal treble damages,
due to the absence of prejudgment interest and a number of other factors,
they are likely to receive only an amount that is close to single damages. 9• This
Essay in many ways takes that conclusion further by demonstrating that most
cartel damages cases settle for significantly less than single damages. Several
important policy implications follow from this.
First, judges should realize that antitrust settlements can be for almost
any percentage of the damages caused by the underlying cartel. As noted in
Part IV, several Recovery Ratios are less than 1 %, and 12 are under 10%. By
contrast, a small number of settlements were for more than actual or double
damages. Of course, the 'Just," "reasonable," or "fair" percentage will vary
according to the relative strength of the case, and will depend on many other
factors.
Although this point might seem obvious, in court decisions the parties
tend to discuss the settlement/sales ratio, which is an inappropriate measure
of victim's welfare. Moreover, parties sometimes agree to settle for very low
percentages of sales (e.g., less than 10%), and then represent to the court that
it should accept their low proposed settlements because these ratios are what
actually occur in private class action cases. 93

91. See D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About
Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST LJ. 201, 208-11 (2012) (reporting on a sUlVey of antitrust
practitioners, who opined that the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of
2004 had little effect on optimal deterrence).
92. See generally Lande, supra note 27.
93. There have been many cases where a party seekingjudicial approval ofa low settlement
percentage has provided citations to similarly low settlements (or purportedly low settlement
amounts) that received court approval. Although we are not aware of any party explicitly asserting
that such figures were "average" or "median" amounts, the lengthy lists of low settlementswithout counsel providing any relatively high examples-would tend to give judges the
impression that these very low settlements are indeed average or median figures. See, e.g., Direct
Purchaser Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Final Approval of Settlements
at 13-14, InreAftermarket Filters Antitrust Litig., No. 08-cv-4883 (N.D. III. Sept. 4,2012) (noting
that the proposed settlement would "amount to a total recovery for the Class of more than 10%
of single damages" and citing cases approving settlement amounts of "5.35% of damages,"
"approximately 12.7% to 15.3%," and "12.2% [as well as al study by Columbia University Law
School, which determined that since 1995, class action settlements have typically recovered
between 5.5% and 6.2% of the class members estimated losses" (internal quotation marks
omitted»; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Settlements with
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Of course, sometimes very low settlements are indeed appropriate.
Nevertheless, courts should ignore the parties' assertions as to what typically,
often, or usually happens in settlements. Most of these submissions are
neither reliable94 nor as relevant as the Recovery Ratio. We instead urge courts
to evaluate each settlement on its merits. If necessary, courts should follow the
lead of the wise and courageous judge in the High-Tech Employee cartel case95
and reject a proposed settlement as being too low, even if it would have
returned $324 million to the victims.
Second, judges should realize that awarded antitrust damages are usually
much less than actual damages, so they should fight any conscious or
unconscious tendency they might have to award defendants close factual or
legal decisions out of a fear that the action will lead to true treble damages
that will "over-punish" defendants and/or "over-reward" plaintiffs. 96 Because
awarded damages are not as a practical matter even close to true treble

Defendants Lan Airlines, S.A., Lan Cargo, S.A., Aerolinhas Brasileiras, S.A., British AilWays PLC,
South Mrican AiIWaYS LTD., Malaysia Airlines, Saudi Arabian Airlines, LTD., Emirates, EI AI Israel
Airlines LTD., Air Canada, AC Cargo LP, and Salvatore Sanfilippo at 22, In reAir Cargo Shipping
Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775 (JC) (WP), 2012 WL 5989756 (E.D.N.Y.June 22, 2012),
2012 WL 3137845 (citing cases for support in which settlement "recovery represented
approximately 2% of sales," "1.62% of sales," and "2.4% of sales"); Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of Settlements with St. John Health. Oakwood Healthcare Inc., and Bon Secours
Cottage Health Services at g-II, Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 06-15601 (E.D. Mich.
July 19, 2010), 2010 WL 3973333- (citing cases for support in which settlements represented
between 0.1 % and 1.6% of relevant sales). We should stress, however, that we are not
commenting on the merits of any of these examples. And, as we have noted elsewhere, sometimes
low settlement percentages are indeed appropriate. See Caulfield, supra note 62 ("In other
antitrust cases, recovering 10% of the total price charged-you're doing well. Recovering 15%
to 18%. you're doing very well. Recovering a third of the total price charged-is
extraordinary ... ." (quoting attorney Michael Hausfeld)).
94. For example, we would be extremely interested to know how each of the estimates
presented in note 93, supra, were calculated. Perhaps the expressed percentages are percentages
of plaintiff's alleged damages? If so, we would like to know whether a neutral scholar ever reexamined these calculations to determine whether plaintiff's assertions were accurate.
95. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
96. As Professor (and former FTC Chairman) William E. Kovacic observed,
a court might fear that the US statutory requirement that successful private plaintiffs
receive treble damages runs a risk of over-deterrence. A court might seek to correct
such perceived infirmities in the anti-trust system by recourse to means directly
within its control-namely by modifying doctrine governing liability standards or by
devising special doctrinal tests to evaluate the worthiness of private claims.
William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition Laws, in 2 CURRENT
COMPETITION L. 167, 173-74 (Mads Andenas etal' eds., 2004); see al50 Stephen Calkins, Summary
Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples ofEquilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74
CEO. LJ. 1065, 1140 (1986) ("One of the ways in which courts have adjusted to the treble
damages remedy is by being relatively more willing to keep cases from going to trial.").
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damages, judges should also refrain from being ungenerous to victims when
they decide standing issues or compute the amounts of damages to award.97
Third, Illinois Brick repealers make more sense.98 The specter of six-fold
or higher damages for civil antitrust violations seems remote. If federal or
state Illinois Brick repealers led to effective double damages for antitrust
violations, this would almost certainly be more nearly optimal than the
current situation. Moreover, Illinois Brick repealers are almost certainly the
best way to compensate consumers who are indirect purchasers of
supracompetitively priced items. Potentially overlapping state antitrust and
tort laws are also more likely to be in the public interest, because their
combined effects are likely only to increase awarded damages to the two-fold
level, rather than the six-fold level.99
Fourth, the Grinnell doctrine, which measures the adequacy of antitrust
settlements as compared to single damages, should be abolished. Professor
Leslie's analysis of why this doctrine is unsound and should be overturned is
compelling. His conclusions are made even stronger by this Essay's conclusion
that few cases settle for even single damages. The Grinnell doctrine could,
moreover, be a large part of the reason why antitrust settlements are so low.

97. On antitrust and its administrability, see generally Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The
Influence of the Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise in the Lower Courts and What It Means for Institutional
Reform in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REv. 1919 (2015); Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance,
Licensing Health Care Professionals, State Action and Antitrust Policy, 100 IOWA L. REv. 1943 (2015);
Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REv. 1969
(2015); Daniel A. Crane, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I Learned in I9I2, 100 IOWA L.
REv. 2025 (2015); Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol,Judicial Treatment ofthe Antitrust Treatise, 100
IOWAL. REv. 2039 (2015); Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents,
100 IOWA L. REv. 2069 (2015); William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, The Federal Trade
Commission as an Independent Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, 100 IOWA L. REv. 2085
(2015); MarkA. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick, 100 IOWA
L. REv. 2115 (2015); Christopher R. Leslie, The Commerce Requirement in Tying Law, 100 IOWA L.
REv. 2135 (2015); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An
Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REv. 2161 (2015); Barak Orbach, The Durability of
Formalism in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REv. 2197 (2015); Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag,
Promoting Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REv. 2223 (2015).
98. For a definition and analysis of Illinois Brick repealer legislation, see Robert H. Lande,
New options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of A ntitrust Violations, 61
ALA. L. REv. 447, 451-60 (2010). See generally Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
99. In addition, on occasions some have proposed that antitrust "treble damages" should
be lowered, at least for certain types of violations. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 84. Because
damages usually are less than single-fold, Congress should not pass legislation that would lower
the damages awarded for rule of reason or for relatively public antitrust violations. Instead, a
crucial question is whether "hardcore" violations are adequately deterred by criminal penalties.
Elsewhere the authors have written that Congress should raise the damages levels for hardcore
cartels. See generally Connor & Lande, supra note 69. Moreover, even relatively public rule of
reason violations often are difficult to prove, so all antitrust violations should give rise to awards
that really are in excess of actual damages. A relatively noncontroversial first step that almost
certainly would lead to the imposition of more nearly optimal damages would be for Congress to
pass a law awarding prejudgment interest for antitrust violations.
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Fifth, the antitrust community should seriously explore the possibility
that criminal antitrust fines should be raised. As the authors have shown
elsewhere, overall cartels are not adequately deterred by the current
combination of private and public remedies. lOo Higher criminal fines would
help provide more nearly optimal deterrence in the cartel area although not,
of course, for other areas of antitrust. This Essay has shown that the
contribution of private cases to cartel deterrence, while certainly important
and significant,101 is not nearly as large as it would be if private cases usually
did secure treble damages.
The primary purpose of this Essay has been to advance the discussion
within the antitrust community about the true relative levels of antitrust
damages, and to help correct the myth that antitrust violations do, or typically
do, lead to treble damages. We analyzed damages in settlements against
cartels simply because we had the necessary information. We urge other
scholars to duplicate our analysis for other areas of antitrust law. We would be
extremely surprised if there is any area of antitrust law for which settlements
average more than single damages, but we would be delighted to be proven
incorrect. 102

See generally Connor & Lande, supra note 69.
See generally Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private
Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REv. 315.
102.
This Essay's analysis shows that antitrust violations probably on average give rise to less
than single damages. An analysis of tort, contract, and other types of cases might well show these
areas of law produce similar or even lower recoveries on average. Even if this is true, such a
showing would not be a reason to fail to correct the antitrust damages multiplier. This Essay does
not assert that the antitrust damages situation is unique, or even that it is more egregious than
that involving other areas of the law. We urge scholars in other areas of law to undertake an
analysis similar to the one performed in this Essay.
100.
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